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I. 
Hobbes has generally been taken to be either the father of modern natural 
law (since he explains the state as a contractual expression of “basic” human 
drives) or the father of modern legal positivism (since he equates the law with 
the will of the sovereign). In this paper I will argue that both readings miss the 
richness and complexity of Hobbes’s political thought, reducing the meaning of 
its elements or confusing them with the whole. Its core lies in the conception of 
the state as a representation – a baroque artifice, in which individuals, both the 
rulers and the ruled, are invited to self-represent themselves anew, wearing the 
masks concordant with the same representation. 
In this reading, therefore, the “contract” does not express a “real bond” be-
tween the state and prior individuals, who do not exist as such in nature qua 
nature. As a metaphor, the “contract” rather expresses a co-constitution of the 
state and individuals themselves, a construction that is as artificial and modern 
as it is self-conscious. What is ultimately proposed is a form of political asceti-
cism in which nature is not expressed but transcended, and the will of the sov-
ereign is not glorified but tamed.
I will also argue that this reading allows us to clarify the continuity between 
Hobbes’s political thought and the post-revolutionary system of national sover-
eignty, as reconstructed by Carré de Malberg, in whose theory of the state one 
finds an ultimate form of Hobbesian asceticism, as now expressed in a purely 
juridical concept of state organ and in a conception of citizenship concordant 
with the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. In Carré de 
Malberg, as in Hobbes, citizens do not “authorize” the state but represent it, 
representing themselves as embodying a nation personified by the state.
II. 
In order to clarify Hobbes’s conception of the state as a representation one 
must begin by reminding that, according to him, a people is formed at the mo-
ment in which a sovereign represents it. Before the collectivity is unified through 
its representation by the sovereign, there is not a people but a multitude (Skinner 
2002a: 399ff.; Hoekstra 2006: loc. 2801ff.).
The said moment pertains to a representational concept of representation: 
both the sovereign and the people – their respective qualities as representative 
and represented – exist only in the human mind. Thus, entailing a relation of rep-
resentation, the state is also a representation of the mind. At issue is the capacity 
of human beings to form representations through their “imagination and artifice” 
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which allows them to escape nature and construct a world that corresponds to 
their needs (Vieira 2009).
That capacity is revealed in language, which is representational, i.e., it 
does not reflect something prior to it but shapes the social and political world. 
Equipped with that understanding, Hobbes enunciates a new political language 
– the language of the modern state1 – at a moment in which the classic political 
heritage, centred in “natural” political units and the corresponding regimes, had 
fallen apart.
III. 
The sovereign, who represents the people, personifies the people. There-
fore, the person of the state coincides with the office of the sovereign. Hob-
bes’s theory of state personality is thus different from the theory of corporate 
personality as developed in the late medieval period. There, the “collective per-
son” or “corporation” was identified with the collective body existing prior to its 
representation. On the contrary, in Hobbes there is no collective body prior to 
the representation but only a multitude. It is the relation of representation that 
constitutes the people and personifies it. 
The fictitious person is therefore identified with the sovereign representing 
the previously inexistent people. One may say, with Hoekstra, that in Hobbes “far 
from the people being king, the king is instead the people” (2006: loc. 2701ff.)
In Hobbes’s own words (2009: XVI, § 12):
“A Multitude of men, are made One Person, when they are 
by one man, or one Person, Represented; so that it be done with 
the consent of every one of that Multitude in particular. For it is the 
Unity of the Representer, not the Unity of the Represented, that 
maketh the Person One. And it is the Representer that beareth 
the Person, and but one Person: And Unity, cannot otherwise be 
understood in Multitude.”
Hobbes’s theory of the personality of the state can only be fully understood 
if one considers his general theory of personality, in particular the distinction be-
tween natural persons and artificial persons. 
1 In Philip Pettit’s formulation, the Hobbesian state is “made with words” (2008: 8ff.).
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Natural persons are individual persons, but they are not mere individuals. 
Conversely, mere individuals are not, as such, persons: they become persons 
through the exercise of their capacity to represent themselves. The individual 
is mere matter, the person is a human responsibility entailing the unification of 
matter into an entity recognizable by others as a person. Thus being, “man as 
artificer is responsible for unifying man as matter” (Vieira 2009: 78).
This theory of “natural” personality will not be strange to jurists, who are 
familiar with the concept of legal person as a repository of rights and responsibil-
ities, a pole of legal relations. What Hobbes defends is that that legal conception 
is not merely fictional but essentially corresponds to what “natural persons” are. 
There is no person until the moment in which someone is capable of represent-
ing oneself, unifying in actions and words susceptible of being taken by others 
as a sign and pledge of his or her responsibility. Individuals who are incapable of 
that self-representation are not natural persons; they must be represented by a 
person of a different kind, i.e., by an artificial or fictitious person.
That is, a natural person is a representation of his or herself; an artificial per-
son is a representation of another entity, be it an individual incapable of self-rep-
resentation, be it a thing, be it a multitude2. The unification of man as matter 
through his self-representation as a natural person matches the unification of 
a multitude – its transformation into a people – through its representation by 
an artificial person: the sovereign. In both cases, human artifice allows man to 
escape nature.
IV. 
In Hobbes, the relation of representation that constitutes the state is not 
aimed at mirroring a community in its prior reality – neither in its “natural” unity of 
ends nor, even less so, in its diversity. Representation is not to be confused with 
representativity. As explained above, the state collectivity is not a reality antedat-
ing the representation, being instead constituted through representation and as 
a representation. The underlying purpose is to establish unity out of that which is 
taken to be common to all: “human nature”.
In opposition to the Aristotelian tradition, human beings are now conceived 
as creatures determined by primary drives, who therefore grant allegiance to 
2 In Hobbes’s words (2009: XVI, §§ 1, 2): «A person is he “whose words or actions are considered, 
either as his own, or as representing the words or actions of another man, or of any other thing to whom 
they are attributed, whether Truly or by Fiction. When they are considered as his owne, then is he called a 
Naturall Person: And when they are considered as representing the words and actions of another, then is 
he a Feigned or Artificiall person.» 
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the sovereign to the degree in which their protection is guaranteed. This does 
not mean however that there is a “human nature” pertaining to the pre-discur-
sive realm of which the state is a mere mechanical expression. Hobbes is not 
a modern natural lawyer in that reductive sense. On the contrary: the state is a 
representation all the way down, so to speak – and conversely, all the way up. 
That is, the new representation – the state – entails a new language on what man 
is. Men who are represented by the sovereign – and represent the sovereign as 
such – are so from the moment they represent themselves as equally deter-
mined by the basic interests the sovereign protects. 
Therefore, at issue in the “new man” is not the “immediate empirical reality of 
individuals”3. Neither is it “man’s true nature”, or even less, “human authenticity”. 
At issue is instead a language that humans should make their own – represent-
ing themselves anew – at a moment in which their existence is no longer viable 
through their incorporation in those hierarchical communities of higher ends that 
had been described in the Aristotelian tradition.
Hobbes’s position during the “engagement controversy” can be illuminating 
at this point. Seeking to justify the taking by the royalists of an “oath of engage-
ment” (i.e., a declaration expressing approval of Charles I’s trial and execution 
and of the abolition of the monarchy and the House of Lords), Hobbes, himself 
associated with the royalist cause, defends the taking of the oath. The ground is 
“his theory of political obligation [as] based not on legitimist principles but on the 
assumption of a strictly mutual relationship between protection and obedience” 
(Skinner 2002b: 22).
On that ground, allegiance to a government that was believed to be a mere 
de facto government by the royalists, was taken to be admissible: any power 
with the capacity to protect them, even if antagonistic to the legitimist principles 
they endorsed, should be envisioned by men as representing them and there-
fore as deserving their obedience. The “oath” would not be a demonstration 
of human authenticity; it would rather involve the assumption by men of a new 
language about themselves and the power they were to obey.
3 Didier Mineur considers that Hobbes’s theory implies “a constructivist conception of the unity of the 
political body that is exterior to the immediate empirical reality of individuals” – and also that political unity is 
the “object of a representation of themselves offered to individuals by power”. Mineur seems, however, to 
assume that the said “empirical reality of individuals” is a given for Hobbes and, consequently, that individ-
uals who “authorize” the state are prior to its construction/representation. Moreover, for Mineur, individuals 
remain divided in spite of “the principle of unity of the body politic which rests on the sovereign himself” 
(2010a: 37ff.). From my perspective, however, a different reading is possible. According to it, as explained 
in the text, individuals themselves are representations (self-representations), i.e., they are not empirical 
realities antedating the state but masks pertaining to the new political language that constitutes the Levia-
than – that new political language being therefore a common code individuals are to adopt as their own as 
“natural persons” who engage in the founding “contract”. It is in this sense that Hobbes’s conception of the 
state as a representation is constructivist all the way down, or all the way up.
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Going back to Hobbes’s corpus, one may dispute such a reading, considering 
those textual elements that point to mere human nature as the “raw material” un-
derlying the state (the latter being the mere mechanical result of a primary drive for 
self-preservation and of an inherent “fear of violent death”). However, one should 
take into account that, in Hobbes, “fear is not created out of nothing”; it is instead 
based on the self-representation of men in their “natural equality” and in their read-
iness to harm one another. The point therefore is not that we are “equal by nature”, 
but that we “acknowledge ourselves as equal”, thus having our “primary” desires 
and aversions as the common drives of our behaviour – not conceiving the “raw 
material” of politics in any other way (Morgado 2008: 263ff.).
In other words, the touchstone of Hobbes’s political architecture is not to 
be found in self-preservation itself but in the self-representation of men as so 
determined in equal manner – wearing the corresponding masks. Men represent 
themselves as “natural persons” at the moment of the original contract – consid-
ering here the representational conception that Hobbes has of “natural persons” 
themselves, as explained above. Moreover, Hobbes is very much aware that 
there is no inevitability or necessity underlying his construction. On the contrary: 
its viability depends on a cultural inversion regarding man’s representation of 
himself and of the power deserving his obedience. In Hobbes’s own words, that 
representation shatters the “moral learning” received “from Rome, and Athens” 
(2009: XXXI, § 20).
In light of the above, the relation of representation is not a mechanical rela-
tion but a co-constitutive relation. In it and through it, both the representative (the 
sovereign) and the represented (the people) are generated – the people being 
a collectivity composed of primordial units, the “natural persons”. The latter are 
“natural beings without natural relations”, taking part in the original “contract” 
detached from all natural groups, relations and beliefs. In truth, it is their re-
newed self-representation as non-natural “natural persons” that the metaphor of 
the “contract” is aimed at illustrating. The artificiality of the “contract” precisely 
means that “an order of representation succeeds an order of incorporation” (Ma-
nent 2001: 228-229).
In sum, at issue is not a “natural” foundation of the state conceived in reduc-
tive terms but an audacious co-constitution of state power and of the persons 
obeying it; a creational relation of representation that redefines political reality 
and man himself. That co-constitution points to a somehow paradoxical form 
of political asceticism. Men are required to self-represent themselves anew with 
reference to those “basic” common drives that subsist beyond their divergent 
relations and beliefs, stepping outside “nature” in the Aristotelian sense. One 
confirms therefore that the “contract” is the axial element of a construction that 
is as artificial and modern as it is self-conscious.
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V. 
In Hobbes, the sovereign is conceived within a relation of representation 
which establishes him as such. That relation finds its “raw material” – only ap-
parently “raw”, as explained above – in “human nature” conceived as equally 
determined by self-interest and, by the same token, in those “natural laws” that 
advance its requirements. The latter are therefore “constitutive of sovereign au-
thority” (Dyzenhaus 2001: 470). In this light, it is equivocal to consider Hobbes to 
be the “father of legal positivism” – at least in its voluntarist variety, one equating 
the law with the will of the sovereign as a really existing and untamed will.
Indeed, the interest of the sovereign – namely when issuing laws – is the 
interest of an artificial person who represents “natural persons” agglutinated into 
a people. That interest is thus constitutively and intrinsically public. Proceeding 
with Dyzenhaus (2001: 482):
«The sovereign who issues commands as a supreme judge 
of a commonwealth is an artificial person. Hobbes always talks of 
the sovereign as one individual, as “he”, perhaps because of his 
own prejudice for monarchy as the form of government best sui-
ted to maintain the commonwealth. But his personification of the 
sovereign cannot escape the general theme of Leviathan. (…) The 
sovereign is an artificial person, a creation of human artifice, and, 
moreover, not even the reasoning head of the great monster, but 
its soul (…). It follows that the benefit intended by the sovereign in 
issuing commands can only be the benefit of the commonwealth, 
which is to say that all commands by definition aim at the common 
good of protection of those subject to the law, the good which in 
turn is the justification for the sovereign’s existence. Commands 
will of course have their origins in some person’s or some body’s 
judgment about a particular aspect of the common good. But in or-
der for that judgment to be a successful command, it must be filte-
red through legal order, for as Hobbes also tells us on the first page 
of Leviathan the equity and laws of the sovereign are an “artificiall 
Reason and Will”. No judgment as to the common good counts 
as command unless it meets whatever criteria are stipulated within 
legal order to be recognized as such». 
When rejecting a reductive qualification of Hobbes as a “father of positivism”, 
one is not of course pretending him to be a classic natural lawyer. Justice taken 
to be a “virtue” that frames the commands of the ruler has no place in Hobbes’s 
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system. Regarding Hobbes, one cannot even speak of “virtues” of the sovereign 
but only of ends of the sovereign, which essentially correspond to the salus 
publica.
The point is that those ends must preside over the commands of a sovereign 
who respects the relation of representation establishing him as such. Therefore, 
those commands cannot be arbitrary or inconsequential: arbitrariness and lack 
of consequence would inevitably harm an impartial solution of controversies by 
those who are to settle them according to the commands of the sovereign4. 
Ultimately, the subjects would be led to solve controversies by their own means, 
falling back into a situation of existential threat. In this case, the relation of rep-
resentation that constitutes the state would inevitably be dissolved, since “The 
Obligation of Subjects to the Soveraign is understood to last as long, and no 
longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them” (2009: XXI, 
§ 14). In sum, the interest of the sovereign coincides with the interests of the 
subjects5. 
In this context, the representational logic establishing the sovereign is not a 
jurisprudential logic in the natural right tradition. It is instead a prudential logic in 
the modern instrumental sense, aimed at assuring the interests of the subjects 
and, by the same token, at strengthening the state. As Loughlin summarizes, 
Hobbes “performed a crucial role in replacing the moral reason of natural law 
with a form of political reason that led to the formation of the modern state as an 
institution promoting civil peace, security and prosperity” (2012: 21).
If in the Hobbesian context reason is prudential or instrumental – and no 
longer moral as in the natural right tradition – Hobbesian political language does 
not fail to be a new language about right, i.e., on what’s right. One can indeed 
refer in this context to a new political right. In its logic, if there are no unjust laws 
of the sovereign, there are beneficent or harmful laws for the subjects and there-
fore for the sovereign. The sovereign would challenge his own representational 
quality – endangering the state – if he ignored that. 
In sum, the sovereign, as his subjects, is not allowed to remove the mask 
corresponding to the state as a representation. In James I’s baroque image, the 
sovereign always stands on a public stage.
4 That according to the “laws of nature”, taking into account particularly the eighteenth law of nature, 
according to which “No Man To Be Judge, That Has In Him Cause Of Partiality” (2009: XV, § 24). 
5 Very significantly, in Hobbes’s work, salus publica is defined from the perspective of the subjects – ad-
dressing the “benefits” they are to enjoy – requiring “that they be defended against foreign enemies”, “that 
peace be preserved at home”, “that they enrich as much as that is consistent with public security” and “that 
they enjoy a harmless liberty” (1998: XIII, § 6).
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VI.
If Hobbes can be taken to be a “father of positivism”, the form of positivism 
he generated is different from a puerile form glorifying the will of the sovereign 
as a really existing and untamed will. That other form can be named as rep-
resentational positivism and reached its zenith in Raymond Carré de Malberg’s 
post-revolutionary theory of the state.
That other form of positivism is distinguished by its denial of an actual sov-
ereign will, thus configurable outside the realm of the state as a representation. 
That is, within representational positivism political reality (the state) is a human 
representation, just like political will itself, the latter being now equated as the will 
of a state organ.
I will return to this point below, but starting at the beginning, it must be said 
first that Carré de Malberg engenders a theory of the state that corresponds to 
the “system of national sovereignty” affirmed by the French Revolution. In that 
system, the state is conceived as a “representation” or “personification” of the 
nation. The nation on its turn is not conceived as prior or independent from that 
representation but is constituted with the same. That is, the nation and the state 
are co-constituted in the moment in which the former is personified by the latter 
(1920: 3-4)6.
The realm in which the nation and the state are co-constituted – a representa-
tional realm of entities that did not exist before – is constitutional discourse or 
state theory, which is now taken to be ultimately based on the principles of the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. Prior to that discourse, there 
is no natural or sociological nation – no collectivity to be personified – but only 
a mass of individuals dispersed “in particular groups, the family, the tribe, the 
gens”. The moment in which “the collectivity is constituted by its very organi-
zation in an indivisible union” is thus an ascetic moment in which the natural or 
sociological differences of previous “constitutive groups” are transcended (1920: 
3-4, 11ff.).
The said moment, entailing a detachment of individuals from those groups, 
involves their self-representation as citizens – who precisely define themselves, 
not by their natural relations, but by their common constitutional status, thus 
embodying a nation. And only at that moment – in which the nation emerges as 
a “general and superior corporation” personified by the state – “national sover-
eignty” emerges. In Carré de Malberg’s words, “there is not, in the state, a sov-
ereignty prior to that which is of the state itself” – i.e., prior to its representation 
within constitutional discourse (1920: 2; 1922: 166, 242).
6 There being “a speculative constitutive combination” of both terms (Maulin 2003: 121).
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According to Carré de Malberg, the system of national sovereignty affirmed 
by the French Revolution means the ultimate consummation of the modern state. 
And in fact what is reproduced here with a maximum degree of sophistication is 
the Hobbesian logic of the state as a representation, which is now reasserted as 
a revolutionary constitutional logic. In continuity with the Hobbesian system, the 
moment of representation entails the constitution of the body politic as a unified 
body with a common status to all citizens. Moreover, it is clarified that that unified 
body – a nation personified by the state – has a “general and common interest” 
that is not to be conceived independently from “individual interests” which are 
now guaranteed as rights (1920: 25-6).
Didier Mineur holds that, unlike that which is the case in Hobbes, in Carré 
de Malberg, the state – or its representation – is not rooted in the “authorization” 
of individuals, there being no “real bond” between the state and the wills of indi-
viduals (2010b: 37ff.). It is true that Carré de Malberg does not conceive of such 
a bond but on that matter he is a descendant of Hobbes – contrary to what is 
believed by Mineur.
According to the above said, in Hobbes, the representation of the state 
implies a simultaneous self-representation of individuals: the contract is a met-
aphor that expresses, not a “real bond”, but a self-representation of individuals 
as equally determined by the interests guaranteed by the state. Well, also in 
Carré de Malberg, the citizens who embody the nation – and who hold the 
interests guaranteed by the state – are not supposed to be pre-existent to the 
nation or the state that personifies it. Prior to the state, as seen above, there 
are only “particular groups, the family, the tribe, the gens”, i.e., relations of in-
corporation and not of citizenship. That means that the citizens themselves are 
representations – self-representations – of human beings which undercut the 
political relevance of those groups and which precisely allow them to integrate 
in a nation.
As to the power of the state, the normativity inherent to Hobbes’s rep-
resentational logic is taken to its ultimate consequences in the system of national 
sovereignty. In truth, the state is now conceived as an “organization”, a “public 
establishment” or a “person” separated into organs, who are not to be confused 
with any concrete officials.
The separation between the natural person of the ruler and his sovereign 
quality had already been clarified by Hobbes. However, in the latter the sovereign 
office was still concrete to a degree: if the sovereign was an office, the office of 
the sovereign was not entirely distinguished from its holder; rather, it implied the 
distinction in that holder of his quality as a natural person, on the one side, and 
his quality as a representative or fictitious person, on the other. Differently, in the 
system of national sovereignty, the entity that represents the nation and in which 
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the nation is personified, is a purely abstract entity. It is “a synthetic and abstract 
being” in Carré de Malberg’s words (1922: 174).
VII.
Carré de Malberg’s theory of the state – in particular his theory of the legal 
personality of the state – pretends itself to be a positivist theory, developing 
within the framework of Isolierung that dominated the legal science of his pe-
riod. In this context, he affirms the state as an “exclusively legal notion” (1920: 
28). However, Carré de Malberg’s theory has an unmistakable prescriptive or 
normative dimension. Its “usefulness” is to “give a firm legal basis to the modern 
system of limitation of powers” without which the citizens would be at the mercy 
of arbitrariness (1922: 30).
Mineur accuses Carré de Malberg of being unable to reconcile “a theory 
of the legal personality of the state developed within a positivist methodology 
aimed as such at isolating legal science” with the prescriptive or normative reach 
of his own theory (2010b: 39). I believe however that Mineur does not take duly 
into account the specificity of Carré de Malberg’s positivist approach. Its point 
is not to “isolate” legal science on purely epistemic reasons. Its point instead is 
to affirm legal science – constitutional discourse – as an autonomous realm of 
representations that has its own logic – namely normative – uncontaminated by 
reality (“natural”, “sociological” or otherwise).
In the realm of “reality”, i.e., in the actual world, only the wills of individuals 
exist. But the will of the state is not something existing in that realm. Rather it is 
the will of an organ of the state – a representational entity – implying the conver-
sion of the actual will of an individual or group of individuals into a will represent-
ed as the state’s, i.e., attributed to the state as a “synthetic and abstract being”. 
Therefore, the will of the state only exists in the realm of representations involving 
what Carré de Malberg names as a raffinement d’abstraction – an “artifice of 
abstraction” (1920: 11-12; 1922: 284ff.).
At the moment in which Carré de Malberg developed his theory of the state, 
the concepts of state personality and of state organ – originally developed by 
German public lawyers – were under fierce criticism by Leon Duguit. For the 
latter, if only the wills of individuals are observable, then the affirmation of a “col-
lective will” of the state is nothing but an “ingenious fiction” aimed at legitimizing 
mere force. That being so, state theory should not assume the existence of the 
state as a “legal person” separated into “organs”; it could only consider the 
phenomenon of power, the brute fact that there are rulers who hold power and 
exercise it, thus commanding the ruled (1921: 460ff.).
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It must be noted that the primary target of Duguit’s criticism were the con-
cepts that had been developed by the German “Gerber/Laband school”. In that 
period, the organ of the state – namely, the monarch – was believed to be the 
actual “representative” of an actual “collective will”, that being the “unified will of 
the German people”. That is, state theory was conceived as a mirror of realities 
conceived as independent from it, its purpose being to “take nineteenth century 
German politics to a conceptual level” (Jouanjan 2005: 231, 254-5).
Now, being this the target of Duguit, one can understand his eagerness to 
denounce the corresponding “fictions” as well as their cryptopolitical effect. Car-
ré de Malberg himself rejects Gerber’s theory, accurately maintaining that “a true 
artifice of abstraction” is absent from it (1920: 11-12).
But in a disarming way for Duguit, Carré de Malberg renews the theory of the 
legal personality of the state and the concept of state organ. Indeed, for Carré de 
Malberg – who reveals himself to be a true successor of Hobbes regarding this 
crucial matter – the theory of the state is not to be conceived as a “mirror” of a 
reality that is prior to it, i.e., it must not fictionalize itself as a reflection of pre-ex-
isting entities7. On the contrary, at issue is something that is consciously artificial.
Only in the realm of artifice – i.e., in the realm of representation in a legal 
sense – can the personification of the nation as the state become conceivable. 
Only in that realm – which is the realm of constitutional discourse – can the sep-
arated wills of individuals who are authorized to act for the state be considered 
to be the “will of the nation” or the “will of the state”. In contrast, in the non-rep-
resentational realm, there are only “individual wills, which as such are divergent, 
unsure of themselves, obscure, insusceptible of being thought as a unity” (1922: 
284ff.).
In the realm of constitutional discourse, it is therefore possible for men to 
transcend nature by entering into another dimension, so to speak. A dimen-
sion in which a collective will, the will of the state, and indeed the personality of 
the state itself, become thinkable. And this is possible for men since they are 
endowed with a representational capacity that allows them to forge an artifi-
cial world that matches their needs. This representational capacity is the legal 
capacity par excellence. In the exercise of that capacity men perform the roles 
ascribed to them by the state as a representation, wearing the corresponding 
masks. And, according to Carré de Malberg, “in law, to perform a role is to have 
the quality” (1920: 41).
Thus, to the extent that they are based on that capacity and respond to 
human needs, the concepts of legal personality and of state organ are not 
7 For Carré de Malberg, the purpose of legal science – and therefore of state theory, which is legal sci-
ence – is not to describe something, but to consider legal relations which are “abstract in character” (1920: 
21).
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“ingenious fictions” aimed at disguising mere force. They are not fictions, to the 
same degree that constitutional law is not a fiction: to deny the state, the legal 
personality of the state, means to deny the legal order that corresponds to it. 
And in truth the underlying human needs or “interests” fundamentally require the 
overcoming of anarchy and the absence of arbitrariness.
In Carré de Malberg’s words, the representation of the state as a legal per-
son – and the concept of state organ – are intended to “provide a firm legal basis 
to the modern system of limitation of powers, namely of those individuals who 
serve as organs of the state. The state must be distinguished from these individ-
uals, at least in the sense that the powers exercised by the latter are so, not in 
their own name, but in the name of the person of the state and by virtue of the 
statute that organizes the state” (1920: 30).
Moreover, the relation between the person of the state and human needs or 
“interests” is not accidental, that is, it does not concern a “function” of the state 
that adds to the state itself. That relation is constitutive of the state, in the sense 
that there is no state without it. Indeed, if a “unified will” did not correspond to 
the state – if the state corresponded merely to the naked will of individual rulers, 
to the brute fact of force, as in Duguit –, then the power of the state would not 
be possible as a stable power capable of claiming obedience.
In Carré de Malberg’s words (1920: 198):
“In the theory of force, that stability is compromised by its own 
principle; if the power of the state consisted merely in the domi-
nation by those who actually held a superior force, the dominated 
individuals would not be kept from using all the means necessary 
to liberate themselves from that force, trying to establish a parallel 
force or, even more, trying to destroy any force of this sort, thus 
suppressing the state (…).The intrinsic error of this theory is to be-
lieve that force itself – any force – can correspond to the state. But 
this force would be only temporary: that regular and stable order 
without which the state cannot be considered to exist would not 
be there.”
Interpreting, the state would deny itself as a stable power if it merely consist-
ed in the use of force of some individuals over others. A stable power must be 
represented as such both by the rulers and the ruled. To the extent that it denies 
the legal personality of the state and questions the concept of state organ – 
and, by the same token, the idea of the state as a representation –, it is Duguit’s 
conception that ultimately reveals itself to be fictional and arbitrary. It builds on 
an empirical appearance, falling into a puerile naturalism, but the state cannot 
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possibly correspond to that appearance – that if by the state one considers a 
power that is continually and durably represented as such by the rulers and the 
ruled.
In sum, the state is a representation, its realm being constitutional discourse. 
That realm is not merely fictional or purely arbitrary, much to the contrary. We are 
speaking of the most distinctive human realm: the world of representations. Only 
in that realm can “the individual who authors the will he produces” not be “the 
author of the will he manifests”, the former being attributed to the state (1922: 
306).
In very similar terms, Eric Maulin (2003: 154ff.) holds that «Carré de Malberg 
rediscovers the central problem of Hobbes’s thought, which consists in thinking 
the existence of a collective and unified will beyond the insuperable singularity of 
the wills of individuals. His merit resides in perceiving that that problem is char-
acteristically legal (…). In that way, Carré de Malberg’s theory of the state leads 
his author to conceive a realm of legal “reality” that is relatively independent from 
empirical reality». Therefore, the personality of the state and the will of its organs 
are not “the result of a natural, spontaneous, process, but the product of human 
artifice, taking the form of a legal order”.
Maulin adds that Carré de Malberg, being responsible for that decisive de-
velopment, does not yet know to “which galaxy” that legal “reality” belongs to. 
This judgment is probably unfair to Carré de Malberg. In truth, the latter is well 
aware that that “galaxy” is the realm of representation in a legal sense; it cor-
responds to a representational reality of men which coincides with post-revolu-
tionary constitutional discourse. The purpose of Carré de Malberg’s theory of the 
state is to offer a systematic account of it.
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